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Class 3F& 85 
Book 



DOBELL COLLECTION 



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ON INSTINCT. 



ON INSTINCT. 



A LECTURE 

DELIVERED BEFORE THE DUBLIN NATURAL HISTORY SOCIETY, 
11th NOVEMBER, 1842. 



RICHARD WHATELY, D.D., 

ARCHBISHOP OF DUBLIN. 



DUBLIN: 
JAMES M C GLASHAN, 21, D'OLIER-STREET. 

W. S. ORR AND CO., 147, STRAND, LONDON. 
MDCCCXLVII. 



4^ 



/ 



205449 
.'13 



ON INSTINCT. 



There is no particular branch of Natural History 
upon which I should be as well qualified to give in- 
struction, or with which I am as well acquainted, as 
many who are here present. If I were to attempt to 
instruct either those who had paid much attention to 
such a study, or again those who were mere beginners, 
in the one case, I should be undertaking to teach 
those who were greater proficients than myself; in 
the other, I should probably be a less skilful instruc- 
tor than they might find in persons more conversant 
with each particular branch of the subject. But hav- 
ing been called upon to deliver a lecture upon some 
point connected with Natural History, I consider it 
would be more suitable in respect to my slender at- 
tainments in each particular branch of Natural His- 
tory, and to the circumstances of the Society, to select 
a point in which Natural History comes in contact 
with the Philosophy of the Human Mind, and those 
metaphysical pursuits to which I have mostly devoted 
myself. 

Besides the intrinsic advantage of directing the atten- 
tion of my audience to this particular branch of study, 
another benefit resulting from such a course of inquiry 
is, to relieve the study of Natural History from some 
part of the discredit under which, with many, it has 
laboured, in being considered as a frivolous occupation 



D ON INSTINCT. 

of the time and faculties of man, leading him to re- 
flect upon, examine, search into, and ascertain the 
facts connected with this science, and all for no pur- 
pose beyond the mere innocent amusement arising 
from the study — a study thus represented as con- 
ducive in no way to the development of the higher 
faculties of the mind, or to the attainment of any 
other benefit to mankind. 

The charge does fairly lie against Natural History 
thus, and only thus studied. And the same might 
be said with regard even to the cultivation of litera- 
ture. If a man went no farther in literary pur- 
suits than to be a good judge of diiferent editions of 
books, or the different modes of binding or printing 
those books, he might make a very useful librarian ; 
but it could not be said that he had turned literary 
knowledge to any of the more dignified purposes for 
which it might be employed. There, no doubt, are 
such persons ; but it would not therefore be true to re- 
gard Literature altogether as merely a Bibliomania — 
a mere curiosity about rare books, because some have 
no other than such literature. And equally unfair 
would it be to pronounce a similar contemptuous cen- 
sure on Naturalists, because there are some among 
them who correspond to those librarian-students just 
alluded to — men who are content to arrange and label, 
as it were, the volumes of the great Book of Nature, and 
then forget to peruse them, or peruse them without 
intelligence, and without profit. 

The point which I have chosen as forming a con- 
tact between Zoology and the branch of Philosophy 
which has relation to the human mind, is the sub- 
ject of INSTINCT. If I or my audience were to 
estimate the propriety of my taking up the examina- 
tion of such a subject, from the degree of information 
from existing books which I could bring to bear upon 
it, my claim to their attention would be very low in- 
deed. I have found so little of a systematic p,p- 



ON INSTINCT. / 

count of the matter in all the authors I have ever 
read, that it struck me it might be desirable to call 
the attention of the audience to the subject. I shall 
be occupied rather in proposing questions for consi- 
deration, than in answering questions myself. In 
many subjects it might be objectionable to take this 
course ; but in this case something may be gained 
by pointing out to you what to ask, and to what you 
should direct your inquiries ; though I could not un- 
dertake to answer the questions which I may propose, 
satisfactorily to myself. At any rate, if I can- 
not give you satisfaction, I hope I can give you un- 
satisfaction — that is, I hope I may be able to render 
you dissatisfied with the extent of your knowledge, 
by pointing out how much there is to be known, to 
be studied, and to be inquired into. 

A Treatise upon the subject of Animal Instincts is 
a desideratum. I have seen in many books interest- 
ing descriptions of different instincts, curiously illus- 
trated by well authenticated facts. I have seen mi- 
nute details of important and interesting characteris- 
tics of Instinct. But I never saw anything like a phi- 
losophic or systematic view of the subject ; nor have I 
ever heard a distinct and satisfactory answer to the 
question, "What do you mean by Instinct?" It 
seems, therefore, that however far advanced we may 
be in a Dictionary on the subject of Instinct, a Gram- 
mar is a thing very much wanted. It is in general 
rather implied and supposed, than distinctly laid down, 
that a Being is acting instinctively when impelled 
blindly towards some end which the agent does not 
aim at or perceive ; and on the other hand, that it is 
acting rationally, when acting with a view to, and for 
the sake of, some end which it does perceive. But in 
the ordinary language even of Naturalists, and even 
when they are describing and recounting instances of 
remarkable Instincts, we often meet with much that 
is inconsistent with this view. And when anv one 



6 ON INSTINCT. 

says, as many are accustomed to do, that Brutes are 
actuated by Instinct, and Man by Reason, this lan- 
guage has the appearance, at least, of being much at 
variance with such a view. 

When I speak of Animal-instinct, it should be 
remembered that I include Man. I presume that 
you have all learned that Man is an Animal, although 
it is a fact frequently forgotten by many. Man pos- 
sesses Instinct, though in a lower degree than most 
other animals ; his inferiority in these being com- 
pensated by his superiority in other respects. And 
again: as Man possesses Instinct in a lower degree 
than the brutes, so, in a lower degree than Man, 
brutes — at least the higher brutes — possess Reason. 
As some things felt and done by Man are allowed to 
be instinctive — as hunger and thirst for instance, are 
evidently instincts — so many things done by brutes, 
at least by the higher description of brutes, would 
be, if done by man, regarded as resulting from the 
exercise of Reason — I mean where the actions of the 
brute spring, to all appearance, from the same im- 
pulse as the rational acts of man. 

In many instances we know this is not the case. A 
man builds a house from Reason — a bird builds a nest 
from Instinct ; and no one would say that the bird, in 
this, actedfrom Reason. But mother instances, Man not 
only does the same things as the brutes, but does them 
from the same kind of impulse, which should be called 
instinctive, whether in man or brute. And again, 
several things are done by brutes, which are evi- 
dently not instinctive, but, to all appearance, no less 
rational than human acts : being not only the same 
actions, but done from the same impulse. I shall not at 
present inquire what is called Reason, any more than 
what is denominated Instinct. I would only say 
that several things which are allowed by every one to 
be acts of Reason, when done by a man, are done by 
brutes manifestly under a similar impulse — I mean 



ON INSTINCT. 9 

such things as brutes learn to do, either by their 
own unaided experience, or, as taught by Man. Do- 
cility is evidently characteristic of Reason. To talk 
of an elephant, a horse, or a dog doing by Instinct 
such things as it has been taught, would be as absurd 
as to talk of a child's learning to read and write by 
Instinct. 

But, moreover, Brutes are, in many instances, 
capable of learning even what they have not been 
taught by Man. They have been found able to com- 
bine, more or less, the means of accomplishing a cer- 
tain end, from having learned by experience that such 
and such means so applied, would conduce to it. 
The higher animals of course show more of Reason, 
than the lower. There are many instances of its 
existence in domestic animals. 

The Dog is regarded as the animal most com- 
pletely man's companion; and I will mention one, 
out of many specimens of the kind of Reason to 
which I refer, as exhibited in a dog. The inci- 
dent is upon record, and there seems no ground 
for doubting it, although it did not come under 
my own personal observation. This dog being 
left on the bank of a river by his master, who 
had gone up the river in a boat, attempted to join 
him. He plunged into the water, but not making 
allowance for the strength of the stream, which car- 
ried him considerably below the boat, he could not 
beat up against it. He landed and made allowance for 
the current of the river, by leaping in at a place 
higher up. The combined action of the stream, and 
his swimming, carried him in an oblique direction, 
and he thus reached the boat. Having made the 
trial, and failed, he apparently judged from the 
failure of the first attempt, that his course was to go 
up the stream, make allowance for its strength, and 
thus gain the boat. I do not vouch for the accuracy 
of this anecdote ; but I see no grounds for disbeliev- 



10 ON INSTINCT. 

ing it, as it is of a piece with many other recorded 
instances. 

There is another instance of this nature, which 
did come under my own observation, and is more 
worthy of being recorded, because the actor was a 
Cat — a species of animal which is considered gene- 
rally very inferior in sagacity to a dog. This cat 
lived many years in my mother's family, and its feats 
of sagacity were witnessed by her, my sisters, and 
myself. It was known, not merely once or twice, 
but habitually, to ring the parlour bell whenever it 
wished the door to be opened. Some alarm was ex- 
cited on the first occasion that it turned bell-ringer. 
The family had retired to rest, and in the middle of 
the night the parlour bell was rung violently : the 
sleepers were startled from their repose, and pro- 
ceeded down stairs, with pokers and tongs, to inter- 
rupt, as they thought, the predatory movement of 
some burglar ; but they were agreeably surprised to 
discover that the bell had been rung by pussy ; who 
frequently repeated the act whenever she wanted 
to get out of the parlour. 

Here are two clear cases of acts done by a cat 
and dog, which, if done by a man, would be called 
reason. Every one would admit that the actions 
were rational — not, to be sure, proceeding from a 
very high exertion of intellect; but the dog, at 
least, rationally jumped into the stream at a dis- 
tance higher up from the boat, into which he wished 
to get, because he found that the stream would thus 
carry him to it, instead of from it ; and the cat pulled 
the parlour bell, because she had observed that when it 
was rung by the family, the servant opened the door. 
It is quite clear that if such acts were done by Man, 
they would be regarded as an exercise of Reason ; and 
I do not know why, when performed by brutes, evident- 
ly by a similar mental process, as far as can be judged, 
they should not bear the same name. To speak of a 



ON INSTINCT. 11 

cat's having an instinct to pull a bell when desirous of 
going out at the door, or of an elephant's lifting up a 
cannon, or beating down a wall, at his driver's com- 
mand, by instinct, would be to use words at random. 
On the other hand, hunger and thirst are as in- 
stinctive in man as in brutes. An invalid, indeed, 
when taking food without appetite, does not act upon 
Instinct ; he acts upon Reason, which tells him that 
unless he eat, his strength would not support the dis- 
ease under which he labours ; but the man who eats 
when he is hungry, and drinks when he is thirsty, 
acts as truly from instinct as the new-born babe 
when it sucks. 

It appears, then, that we can neither deny Reason 
universally and altogether to brutes, nor Instinct to 
Man ; but that each possesses a share of both, though 
in very different proportions. Then the question 
naturally arises — which is one I propose, but do not 
presume positively to decide — "What is the differ- 
ence between Man and the higher brutes ?" We 
have already decided, in reference to one point, what 
the difference does not consist in. It is not that 
brutes are wholly destitute of everything that, in 
Man, we call Reason. Instances to the contrary, si- 
milar to what have been above mentioned, might be 
produced to a great extent. But this would be su- 
perfluous ; because, as has been said, the docility of 
many brutes is familiar to all : and if any one could 
seriously speak of teaching anything to a Being 
wholly devoid of reason, he would evidently be using 
the word in some sense quite different from that in 
which it is ordinarily employed. 

And yet the difference between Man and brute, in 
respect of intelligence, appears plainly to be not a 
difference in mere degree, but in hind. An intelli- 
gent brute is not like a stupid man. The intelligence 
and sagacity shown by the elephant, monkey, and 



12 ON INSTINCT. 

dog, are something very different from the lowest 
and most stupid of human Beings. It is a difference 
in kind, not merely in degree. 

It strikes me that in all the most striking 
instances in which brutes display reason, all the 
intellectual operation seems to consist in the com- 
bination of means to an end. The dog who swam 
from a higher part of the river to reach the boat ; 
the cat who rang the bell to call the servant ; the 
elephant of whom we have read that was instructed by 
his keeper off hand to raise himself from a tank into 
which he had fallen, by means of faggots, thrown 
into him by the keeper, on which the elephant raised 
himself from the pit, and from which all the wind- 
lasses and cranes in the Indian empire could not have 
extricated him ; the monkey in the Zoological Gar- 
dens, who used to possess himself of a nut placed 
beyond the reach of his paw, by doubling a straw, 
and casting this round it, by which means he was 
enabled to draw it towards him : these, and many 
other similar instances of sagacity, appear to consist 
in the adaptation of means to an end. 

But the great difference between Man and the 
higher brutes appears to me to consist in the power 
of using SIGNS — arbitrary signs — and employing 
language as an instrument of thought. We are ac- 
customed to speak of language as useful to man, to 
communicate his thoughts. I consider this as only 
one of the uses of language. That use of language 
which, though commonly overlooked, is the most 
characteristic of Man, is as an instrument of thought. 
Man is not the only animal that can make use of 
language to express what is passing within his mind, 
and that can understand, more or less, what is so ex- 
pressed by another. Some brutes can be taught to 
utter, and many others, to understand, more or less 
imperfectly, sounds expressive of certain emotions. 
Every one knows that the dog understands the gene- 



ON INSTINCT. 13 

ral drift of expressions used ; and parrots can be 
taught not only to pronounce words, but to pronounce 
them with some consciousness of the general mean- 
ing of what they utter. We commonly speak, indeed, 
of (i saying so-and-so by rote as a parrot ;" but it is 
by no means true that they are quite unconscious of 
the meaning of the sounds. Parrots do not utter 
words at random; for they call for food; when dis- 
pleased, scold ; and use expressions in reference to 
particular persons which they have heard applied to 
them. They evidently have some notion of the 
general drift of many expressions which they use. 
Almost every animal which is capable of being 
tamed can, in some degree, use language as an indi- 
cation of what passes within. But no animal has 
the use of language as an (i instrument of thought." 
Man makes use of general signs in the applica- 
tion of his power of Abstraction by which he is enabled 
to reason ; and the use of arbitrary general signs, 
what logicians call " common terms" with a facility 
of thus using Abstraction at pleasure, is a character- 
istic of Man. 

By the expression " making use of abstraction," I 
do not mean our merely recognizing the general cha- 
racter of some individual, not seen before, of a class 
we are acquainted with ; as when, for instance, any 
one sees for the first time some particular man or 
horse, and knows that the one is a man, and the 
other a horse. For this is evidently done by brutes. 
A bird, for instance, which has been used to fly from 
men, and not from oxen, will fly from an individual 
man whom it has never seen before, and will have no 
fear of an ox. But this is not having what I call the 
power of using abstraction at pleasure. It is merely 
that similar qualities affect animals in a similar way. 
With certain description of forms are associated 
ideas of fear or gratification. Thus a young calf 
readily comes up to a woman whom it sees for the 



14 ON INSTINCT. 

first time, because a woman has been used to feed it 
with milk ; while the young of wild animals fly from 
any human Being. But I speak of Man being able 
so to use the power of abstraction as to employ 
signs to denote any or every individual of a certain 
class. 

Perhaps you may think that I am giving a remark- 
able instance of instinctive love of an author for the 
offspring of his own mind, by quoting from a work 
written by myself. But it is necessary to refer to the 
passages which treat of language as an instrument of 
thought in the " Elements of Logic :" — " In inward 
solitary reasoning, many, and perhaps most persons, 
but especially those not much accustomed to read or 
speak concerning the subjects that occupy their 
thoughts, make use, partly, of Signs that are not ar- 
bitrary and conventional, but which consist of men- 
tal-cow ceptions of individual objects ; taken, each, as 
a representative of a Class. E.g.a, person practically 
conversant with mechanical operations, but not with 
discussions of them in words, may form a conception 
of — in colloquial phrase, c figure to himself — a cer- 
tain field or room, with whose shape he is familiar, 
and may employ this, in his inward trains of thought, 
as a Sign, to represent, for instance, * parallelogram' 
or c trapezium,' &c. ; or he may ' figure to himself a 
man raising a weight by means of a pole, and may 
use this conception as a general Sign, in place of the 
term ' lever;' and the terms themselves he maybe 
unacquainted with ; in which case he will be at a loss 
to impart distinctly to others his own reasonings ; 
and in the attempt, will often express himself (as one 
may frequently observe in practical men unused to 
reading and speaking) not only indistinctly, but even 
erroneously. Hence, partly, may have arisen the 
belief in those supposed ' abstract ideas' which will 
be hereafter alluded to, and in the possibility of rea- 
soning without the use of any Signs at all. 



ON INSTINCT. 15 

"Supposing there really exist in the mind — or in 
some minds — certain ' abstract ideas,' by means of 
which a train of reasoning may be carried on indepen- 
dently of Common-terms [or Signs of any kind] — for 
this is the real point at issue — and that a system of 
Logic may be devised, having reference to such rea- 
soning — supposing this — still, as I profess not to 
know anything of these ' abstract ideas/ or of any 
f Universals' except Signs, or to be conscious of any 
such reasoning process, I at least must confine myself 
to the attempt to teach the only Logic I do pretend 
to understand. Many, again, who speak slightingly 
of Logic altogether, on the ground of its being ' con- 
versant only about words, entertain fundamentally 
the same views as the above ; that is, they take for 
granted that Reasoning may be carried on altogether 
independently of Language ; which they regard (as 
was above remarked) merely as a means of communi- 
cating it to others. And a Science or Art which they 
suppose to be confined to this office, they accordingly 
rank very low. 

" Such a view I believe to be very prevalent. The 
majority of men would probably say, if asked, that 
the use of Language is peculiar to Man ; and that its 
office is to express to one another our thoughts and 
feelings. But neither of these is strictly true. Brutes 
do possess in some degree the power of being taught 
to understand what is said to them, and some of them 
even to utter sounds expressive of what is passing 
within them. But they all seem to be incapable of 
another very important use of Language, which does 
characterize Man — viz., the employment of ' Com- 
mon-terms' ('general-terms') formed by Abstraction, 
as instruments of thought ; by which alone a train of 
Reasoning may be carried on. 

"And accordingly, a Deaf-mute, before he has been 
taught a Language — either the Finger-language or 
Beading — cannot carry on a train of Beasoning, any 



16 ON INSTINCT. 

more than a Brute. He differs indeed from a Brute 
in possessing the mental capability of employing Lan- 
guage ; but he can no more make use of that capabi- 
lity, till he is in possession of some System of arbitrary 
general-signs, than a person born blind from Cataract 
can make use of his capacity of Seeing, till the Cata- 
ract is removed. 

" Hence it will be found by any one who will ques- 
tion a Deaf-mute who has been taught Language after 
having grown up, that no such thing as a train of 
Reasoning had ever passed through his mind before 
he was taught. 

" If indeed we did reason by means of those ' Ab- 
stract ideas' which some persons talk of, and if the 
Language we use served merely to communicate with 
other men, then a person would be able to reason who 
had no knowledge of any arbitrary Signs. But there 
are no grounds for believing that this is possible ; 
nor consequently, that ' Abstract-ideas' (in that sense 
of the word) have any existence at all. 

"There have been some very interesting accounts 
published, by travellers in x\m erica, and by persons 
residing there, of a girl named Laura Bridgeman, who 
has been, from birth, not only Deaf and Dumb, but 
also Blind. She has, however, been taught the fin- 
ger-language, and even to read what is printed in 
raised characters, and also to write. 

"The remarkable circumstance in reference to the 
present subject, is, that when she is alone, her fingers 
are generally observed to be moving, though the signs 
are so slight and imperfect that others cannot make 
out what she is thinking of. But if they inquire of 
her, she will tell them. 

"It seems that, having once learnt the use of 
Signs, she finds the necessity of them as an Instru- 
ment of thought, when thinking of anything beyond 
mere individual objects of sense. 

" And doubtless every one else does the same ; 



ON INSTINCT. 17 

though in our case, no one can (as in the case of 
Laura Bridgeman) see the operation : nor, in general, 
can it be heard ; though some few persons have a 
habit of occasionally audibly talking to themselves ; or 
as it is called, c thinking aloud.' But the Signs we 
commonly use in silent reflection are merely mental 
conceptions, usually of uttered words : and these doubt- 
less are such as could be hardly at all understood by 
another, even if uttered audibly. For we usually think 
in a kind of short-hand (if one may use the expres- 
sion), like the notes one sometimes takes down on pa- 
per to help the memory, which consist of a word or 
two — or even a letter — to suggest a whole sentence ; 
so that such notes would be unintelligible to any one 
else. 

"It has been observed also that this girl, when 
asleep, and doubtless dreaming, has her fingers fre- 
quently in motion : being in fact talking in her 
sleep. 

" Universally, it is to be steadily kept in mind, 
that no ' common-terms' have, as the names of Indi- 
viduals [ ( singular terms'] have, any real thing exist- 
ing in nature corresponding to each of them, but that 
each of them is merely a Sign denoting a certain in- 
adequate notion which our minds have formed of an 
Individual, and which, consequently, not including 
the notion of ' individuality' \numerical-xm\tf], nor 
anything wherein that individual differs from certain 
others, is applicable equally well to all, or any of 
them. Thus 'man' denotes no real thing (as the 
sect of the Realists maintained) distinct from each in- 
dividual, but merely any man, viewed inadequately, 
i.e., so as to omit, and abstract from, all that is pe- 
culiar to each individual ; by which means the term 
becomes applicable alike to any one of several indivi- 
duals, or [in the plural] to several together. 

" The unity [singleness or sameness] of what is de- 
noted by a common-term, does not, as in the case of a 



18 ON INSTINCT. 

singular-texm, consist in the object itself being (in 
the primary sense) one and the same, but in the one- 
ness of the Sign itself : which is like a Stamp (for 
marking bales of goods or cattle), that impresses on 
each a similar mark ; called thence, in the secondary 
sense, one and the same mark. And just such a 
stamp, to the mind, is a Common-term ; which being 
itself one, conveys to each of an indefinite number of 
minds an impression precisely similar, and thence 
called, in the transferred sense, one and the same 
Idea. 

" And we arbitrarily fix on the circumstance which 
we in each instance chuse to abstract and consider 
separately, disregarding all the rest ; so that the same 
individual may thus be referred to any of several 
different Species, and the same Species, to several 
Genera, as suits our purpose. Thus it suits the 
Farmer's purpose to class his cattle with his ploughs, 
carts, and other possessions, under the name of 
' stock :' the Naturalist, suitably to his purpose, 
classes them as ' quadrupeds, 9 which term would in- 
clude wolves, deer, &c, which, to the farmer, would 
be a most improper classification : the Commissary, 
again, would class them with corn, cheese, fish, &c, 
as 'provision ;' that which is most essential in one 
view, being subordinate in another. 

" Nothing so much conduces to the error of Real- 
ism as the transferred and secondary use of the words 
1 same, 5 ' one and the same,' ' identical,' &c, when it 
is not clearly perceived and carefully borne in mind, 
that they are employed in a secondary sense, and 
that more frequently even than in the primary. 

" Suppose e.g. a thousand persons are thinking of 
the Sun : it is evident it is one and the same indivi- 
dual object on which all these minds are employed. 
So far all is clear. But suppose all these persons are 
thinking of a Triangle — not any individual triangle, 
but Triangle in general — and considering, perhaps, 



ON INSTINCT. 19 

the equality of its angles to two right angles : it would 
seem as if, in this case also, their minds were all em- 
ployed on 'one and the same' object : and this object 
of their thoughts, it may be said, cannot be the mere 
word Triangle, but that which is meant by it : nor 
again, can it be everything that the word will apply 
to : for they are not thinking of triangles, but of oft? 
thing. Those who do not maintain that this ' one* 
thing' has an existence independent of the human 
mind, are in general content to tell us, by way of ex- 
planation, that the object of their thoughts is the ab- 
stract ' idea' of a triangle ; an explanation which sa- 
tisfies, or at least silences many ; though it may be 
doubted whether they very clearly understand what 
sort of thing an ' idea' is ; which may thus exist in 
a thousand different minds at once, and yet be ' one 
and the same.' 

" The fact is, that ' unity' and f sameness' are in 
such cases employed, not in the primary sense, but to 
denote perfect similarity. When we say that ten 
thousand different persons have all c one and the 
same' Idea in their minds, or are all of ( one and the 
same' Opinion, we mean no more than that they are 
all thinking exactly alike. When we say that they 
are all in the ( same' posture, we mean that they are 
all placed alike ; and so also they are said all to have 
the * same' disease, when they are all diseased alike." 

It is hardly necessary to add, that I am a decided 
nominalist. The abstract Ideas of which persons 
speak, and the mere names of which language is 
represented as furnishing, are things to which I am 
a stranger. The using of Signs of some kind, such 
as have been above described, the combining and re- 
combining of these in various ways, and the analyz- 
ing and constructing of passages wherein they occur, 
this is what I mean by the employment of language 
as an instrument of thought ; and this is what no 
brute has arrived at. Brutes have (as has been said 



20 ON INSTINCT. 

above), more or less, the use of language to convey 
to others what is passing within them. But the 
power of employing Abstraction at pleasure, so as to 
form " general Signs" and make use of these Signs as 
an instrument of thought, in carrying on the process 
which is strictly called Reasoning, is probably the 
chief difference of Man and the brute ; but Reason, in 
a sense in which the term is often employed, is, to a 
certain extent, common to Man and brute. And In- 
stinct, again, although possessed by Man in an infe- 
rior degree to that of the brutes, is, in some points, 
common to both. 

Brutes, as has been said, have not command over 
Abstraction, so as to make use of it to form general 
Signs ; and it may be added, that different men are, 
as to this point, elevated in various degrees — some 
more and some less — above the brutes. A great 
degree of a certain kind of intelligence, similar to 
what is found in the higher descriptions of brutes, is 
found in some men who have a great inaptitude 
for abstract Reasoning. Persons may often be met 
with who have much of a certain practical sagacity, 
and are accounted knowing, clever, and ingenious, 
who yet are even below the average in respect of 
any scientific studies ; and others again, who rank 
high in that particular kind of intelligence, which is 
altogether peculiar to Man, are often greatly inferior 
to others in those mental powers which are, to a 
certain degree, common to Man with the higher 
brutes. 

To sum up, then, what has been hitherto said : it 
appears that there are certain kinds of intellectual 
power — of what, in Man, at least, is always called 
Reason — common, to a certain extent, to Man with 
the higher brutes. And again : that there are cer- 
tain powers wholly confined to Man — especially all 
those concerned in what is properly called Reason- 



ON INSTINCT. 21 

ing — all employment of language as an instrument 
of thought ; and it appears that Instinct, again, is, 
to a certain extent, common to Man with brutes, 
though far less in amount, and less perfect in Man ; 
and more and more developed in other animals, 
the lower we descend in the scale. 

An Instinct is, as has been said above, a blind ten- 
dency to some mode of action, independent of any 
consideration on the part of the agent, of the end to 
which the action leads. Hunger and thirst are no 
less an instinct in the adult, than the desire of the 
new-born babe to suck, although it has no idea that 
milk is in the breast, or that it is nutritious. When, 
on the other hand, a man builds a house, in order to 
have shelter from the weather, and a comfortable 
place to pursue his trade, or reside in, the act is not 
called Instinct ; while that term does apply to a bird's 
building a nest : because Man has not any blind 
desire to build the house. The rudest savage always 
contemplates, in forming his hut, the very object of 
providing a safeguard against the weather, and per- 
haps against wild beasts and other enemies. But, 
supposing Man had the Instinct of the bird — suppos- 
ing a man who had never seen a house, or thought 
of protecting himself, had a tendency to construct 
something analogous to a nest ; or again, supposing 
a bird was so endowed with reason as to build a nest 
with a view to lay eggs therein, and sit on them, 
with a design, and in order, to perpetuate its species : 
in the former case Man would be a builder from 
Instinct, and in the latter, the bird would be a builder 
from Reason. 

But it is worth observing that there are many cases 
in which, though the agent is clearly acting from 
rational design with a view to a certain end, yet the 
act may, in reference to another and quite different 
end, which he did not contemplate, be considered as 
in some sort instinctive. When, for instance, any 



22 ON INSTINCT. 

one deliberately takes means to provide food for the 
gratification of his hunger, and has no other object 
in view, his acts are, evidently, with a view to that 
immediate end, rational and not instinctive. But he 
is, probably, at the same time, and by the same act, 
promoting another object, the preservation of his life, 
health, and strength ; which object, by supposition, 
he was not thinking about. His acts, therefore, are 
in reference to the preservation of life — analogous, at 
least, to those of Instinct ; though, in reference to the 
object he was contemplating — the gratification of hun- 
ger — they are the result of deliberate calculation. 

There are many portions of men's conduct to which 
this kind of description will apply — particularly all 
that men do with a view solely to their own indivi- 
dual advantage, but which does produce most import- 
ant, though undesigned, advantages to the public. 
" And this procedure" (as I have observed in the 
Fourth Lecture on Political Economy) " is, as far as 
regards the object which the agent did not contem- 
plate, precisely analogous, at least, to that of instinct. 

lt The workman, for instance, who is employed in 
casting printing- types, is usually thinking only of 
producing a commodity by the sale of which he may 
support himself; with reference to this object, he is 
acting, not from any impulse that is at all of the cha- 
racter of instinct, but from a rational and deliberate 
choice : but he is also, in the very same act, contri- 
buting most powerfully to the diffusion of knowledge, 
about which perhaps he has no anxiety or thought : 
in reference to this latter object, therefore, his pro- 
cedure corresponds to those operations of various ani- 
mals which we attribute to instinct ; since they doubt- 
less derive some immediate gratification from what 
they are doing. So Man is, in the same act, doing 
one thing, by choice, for his own benefit, and another, 
undesignedly, under the guidance of Providence, for 
the service of the community." 



ON TNSTINCT. 23 

And again, "various parts of man's conduct as a 
member of society are often attributed to human fore- 
thought and design, which might with greater truth 
be referred to a kind of instinct, or something analo- 
gous to it ; which leads him, while pursuing some 
immediate personal gratification, to further an object 
not contemplated by him. In many cases we are 
liable to mistake for the wisdom of Man what is in 
truth the wisdom of God. 

" In nothing, perhaps, will an attentive and candid 
inquirer perceive more of this Divine wisdom than in 
the provisions made for the progress of society. But 
in nothing is it more liable to be overlooked. In the 
bodily structure of Man we plainly perceive innumer- 
able marks of wise contrivance, in which it is plain 
that Man himself can have had no share. And again, 
in the results of instinct in brutes, although the ani- 
mals themselves are, in some sort, agents, we are 
sure that they not only could not originally have de- 
signed the effects they produce, but even afterwards 
have no notion of the contrivance by which these were 
brought about. But when human conduct tends to 
some desirable end, and the agents are competent to 
perceive that the end is desirable, and the means well 
adapted to it, they are apt to forget that, in the great 
majority of instances, those means were not devised, 
nor those ends proposed, by the persons themselves 
who are thus employed. Those who build and who 
navigate a ship, have usually, I conceive, no more 
thought about the national wealth and power, the na- 
tional refinements and comforts, dependent on the in- 
terchange of commodities, and the other results of 
commerce, than they have of the purification of the 
blood in the lungs by the act of respiration, or than 
the bee has of the process of constructing a honey- 
comb. 

" Most useful indeed to Society, and much to be 
honoured, are those who possess the rare moral and 



24 ON INSTINCT. 

intellectual endowment of an enlightened public spi- 
rit ; but if none did service to the Public except in 
proportion as they possessed this, Society I fear would 
fare but ill. Public spirit, either in the form of Pa- 
triotism which looks to the good of a community, or 
in that of Philanthropy which seeks the good of the 
whole human race, implies, not merely benevolent feel- 
ings stronger than, in fact, we commonly meet with, 
but also powers of abstraction beyond what the mass 
of mankind can possess. As it is, many of the most 
important objects are accomplished by the joint agency 
of persons who never think of them, nor have any idea 
of acting in concert ; and that with a certainty, com- 
pleteness, and regularity, which probably the most 
diligent benevolence under the guidance of the great- 
est human wisdom, could never have attained. 

"For instance, let any one propose -to himself the 
problem of supplying with daily provisions of all kinds 
such a city as our metropolis, containing above a mil- 
lion of inhabitants. Let him imagine himself a head 
commissary, entrusted with the office of furnishing 
to this enormous host their daily rations. Any con- 
siderable failure in the supply, even for a single day, 
might produce the most frightful distress, since the 
spot on which they are cantoned produces absolutely 
nothing. Some, indeed, of the articles consumed 
admit of being reserved in public or private stores, 
for a considerable time ; but many, including most 
articles of animal food, and many of vegetable, are of 
the most perishable nature. As a deficient supply of 
these, even for a few days, would occasion great incon- 
venience, so a redundancy of them would produce a 
corresponding waste. Moreover, in a district of such 
vast extent, as this 'province' (as it has been aptly 
called) ' covered with houses/ it is essential that the 
supplies should be so distributed among the different 
quarters, as to be brought almost to the doors of the 
inhabitants ; at least within such a distance that they 



ON INSTINCT. 25 

may, without an inconvenient waste of time and la- 
bour, procure their daily shares. 

"Moreover, whereas the supply of provisions for an 
army or garrison is comparatively uniform in kind : 
here the greatest possible variety is required, suitable 
to the wants of various classes of consumers. 

"Again, this immense population is extremely 
fluctuating in numbers ; and the increase or diminu- 
tion depends on causes, of which, though some may, 
others can not, be distinctly foreseen. The difference 
of several weeks in the arrival, for instance, of one of 
the great commercial fleets, or in the assembly or dis- 
solution of a parliament, which cause a great varia- 
tion in the population, it is often impossible to fore- 
see. 

" Lastly, and above all, the daily supplies of each 
article must be so nicely adjusted to the stock from 
which it is drawn — to the scanty, or more or less 
abundant, harvest — importation — or other source of 
supply — to the interval which is to elapse before a 
fresh stock can be furnished, and to the probable 
abundance of the new supply, that as little distress 
as possible may be undergone ; that on the one hand 
the population may not unnecessarily be put upon short 
allowance of any article, and that on the other hand 
they may be preserved from the more dreadful risk 
of famine, which would ensue from their continuing 
a free consumption when the store was insufficient to 
hold out. 

" Now let any one consider this problem in all its 
bearings, reflecting on the enormous and fluctuating 
number of persons to be fed — the immense quantity, 
and the variety, of the provisions to be furnished, the 
importance of a convenient distribution of them, and 
the necessity of husbanding them discreetly ; and 
then let him reflect on the anxious toil which such a 
task would impose on a Board of the most expe- 
rienced and intelligent commissaries ; who after all 



26 ON INSTINCT. 

would be able to discharge their office but very in- 
adequately. 

" Yet this object is accomplished far better than it 
could be by any effort of human wisdom, through 
the agency of men, who think each of nothing be- 
yond his own immediate interest — who, with that 
object in view, perform their respective parts 
with cheerful zeal — and combine unconsciously to 
employ the wisest means for effecting an object, the 
vastness of which it would bewilder them even to con- 
template. 

" It is really wonderful to consider with what ease 
and regularity this important end is accomplished, 
day after day, and year after year, through the saga- 
city and vigilance of private interest operating on the 
numerous class of wholesale, and more especially re- 
tail, dealers. Each of these watches attentively the 
demands of his neighbourhood, or of the market he 
frequents, for such commodities as he deals in. The 
apprehension, on the one hand, of not realizing all 
the profit he might, and, on the other hand, of hav- 
ing his goods left on his hands, either by his laying 
in too large a stock, or by his rivals underselling him 
— these, acting like antagonist muscles, regulate the 
extent of his dealings, and the prices at which he 
buys and sells. An abundant supply causes him to 
lower his prices, and thus enables the public to enjoy 
that abundance ; while he is guided only by the ap- 
prehension of being undersold ; and, on the other 
hand, an actual or apprehended scarcity causes him 
to demand a higher price, or to keep back his goods 
in expectation of a rise. 

* For doing this, corn-dealers in particular are often 
exposed to odium, as if they were the cause of the 
scarcity ; while in reality they are performing the 
important service of husbanding the supply in pro- 
portion to its deficiency, and thus warding off the ca- 
lamity of famine ; in the same manner as the com- 



ON INSTINCT. 27 

mander of a garrison or a ship regulates the allow- 
ances according to the stock, and the time it is to 
last. But the dealers deserve neither censure for the 
scarcity which they are ignorantly supposed to pro- 
duce, nor credit for the important public service which 
they in reality perform. They are merely occupied 
in gaining a fair livelihood. And in the pursuit of 
this object, without any comprehensive wisdom, or 
any need of it, they co-operate, unknowingly, in con- 
ducting a system which, we may safely say, no hu- 
man wisdom directed to that end could have con- 
ducted so well — the system by which this enormous 
population is fed from day to day. 

" I have said, ' no human wisdom ;' for wisdom 
there surely is in this adaptation of the means to the 
result actually produced. In this instance, as well as 
in a multitude of others, from which I selected it for 
illustration's sake, there are the same marks of con- 
trivance and design, with a view to a beneficial end, 
as we are accustomed to admire (when our attention 
is drawn to them by the study of Natural Theology) 
in the anatomical structure of the body, and in the 
instincts of the brute creation. The pulsations of 
the heart, the ramifications of vessels in the lungs — 
the direction of the arteries and of the veins — the 
valves which prevent the retrograde motion of the 
blood — -all these exhibit a wonderful combination of 
mechanical means towards the end manifestly design- 
ed, the circulating system. But I know not whether 
it does not even still more excite our admiration of 
the beneficent wisdom of Providence, to contemplate, 
not corporeal particles, but rational free agents, co- 
operating in systems no less manifestly indicating de- 
sign, yet no design of their' s; and though acted on, 
not by gravitation and impulse, like inert matter, but 
by motives addressed to the will, jet advancing as re- 
gularly and as effectually the accomplishment of an 
object they never contemplated, as if they were mere- 
ly the passive wheels of a machine." 



28 ON INSTINCT. 

As for Instincts strictly so-called — those wholly 
unconnected with anything rational in the agent — 
these are, as has been said, more and more curiously 
developed the lower we go in the animal creation. 
Insects far surpass in this respect the more intelli- 
gent brutes. The architecture of many of these is 
far more complicated and curious, than that of the 
bird or the beaver ; and they not only construct re- 
ceptacles for their young, but, in many instances — 
that of the bee among others — store up in these a 
supply of food of a totally different kind from what 
they subsist on themselves. 

The gratification which, doubtless, is in all cases 
afforded by the performance of any instinctive act, is 
what we can give no explanation of. Birds take a 
delight in picking up straws and feathers, and weav- 
ing them into a nest ; and bees, in constructing a 
cell, and storing it with pollen, which they do not 
eat themselves, but which is the food of the larvae. 
All we can say is, that the bird has a kind of appe- 
tite at a certain season for picking up straws ; and so 
for the rest. But the mysteriousness of the process 
is greater in some cases than in others ; because, in 
some cases we cannot, while in others we can, per- 
ceive through what medium the instinct acts. We 
can understand, for instance, through the means of 
what organs the instinct of sucking and suckling 
operate. We can understand that the young calf is 
incited to suck by the smell of its mother's milk, 
and that the mother is anxious to be sucked by its 
young, because it is thus relieved from a painful and 
distressing distention of the udder ; but I cannot 
understand the analogous instinct of birds. We do 
not knowthrough the medium of what organs birds are 
induced to put food into the mouths of their young. 
We see a pair of birds searching all day long for 
food ; and in many instances the food they seek 
is such as they do not feed on themselves — for 
example, granivorous birds hunt after caterpillars for 



ON INSTINCT. 29 

their young : in other cases they seek for food which 
their own appetite incites them to eat ; but they trea- 
sure it for their young, and are impelled by an in- 
stinctive appetite to put it into its mouth when 
opened. I might also add, that this instinct is not 
peculiar to birds. The mammalia partake of it ; 
for we find wolves, dogs, and other carnivorous 
animals, bringing home meat, and leaving it before 
their young ones. If a bitch or wolf has pups, and 
cannot bring food to them otherwise than by first 
swallowing it, she swallows it, and then disgorges it ; 
for the animal has the power of evacuating its 
stomach at pleasure. Pigeons invariably swallow the 
food before they give it to their young. 

There are many other cases in which it cannot be 
ascertained towards what the immediate impulses of 
animals tend. Take the case of migratory birds — 
a those which have been caged : when a particular 
jason arrives, they desire to fly in a certain direc- 
tion. Now, towards what the impulse is we cannot 
comprehend. They have a disposition to fly ; but it 
is not a mere desire to use their wings. They have 
a disposition to fly in a certain direction ; but what 
leads them in that direction cannot be understood. 

In some instances, in short, we know through 
what organs the impulse acts, although we cannot 
understand why it is that the organs should have 
that particular sort of impelling power. In other in- 
stances we do not know the organs, or the impulse 
on which the animal acts, but only the object de- 
signed by Providence. As for instance, we can only 
say of migratory birds, that they are impelled not by 
a mere desire to use their wings, but to fly in a cer- 
tain direction pointed out to them by God ; but how 
pointed out, is only known to Him. 

It is not my design to give a lecture on natural 
theology — a subject which has been ably treated of by 



30 ON INSTINCT. 

Paley and others ; but I will take occasion to remark 
that one of the most interesting and important points 
dwelt on by these authors is, the combination of 
physical laws with instincts adapted to them. When 
we see a combination of causes all apparently di- 
rected from various quarters to a certain end, which 
is accomplished not by one impulse alone, but by an 
adaptation of several impulses to certain physical 
laws, one of which would not be effectual without 
the other, we can not hesitate for a moment to 
recognize this great principle in nature. One instance 
out of many, of this principle, may be taken as a 
sample — that of the instinct of suction, as con- 
nected with the whole process of rearing young 
animals. The calf sucks, and its mother equally 
desires to be disburthened of its milk. Thus there 
are two instincts tending the same way. Moreover, 
the calf has an appetite for grass also ; it takes hold 
of the grass, chews and swallows it; but it does not bite 
but sucks the teat. But it is also necessary that there 
should be a physical adaptation of the atmosphere to 
the instinct of the animal. It is the pressure of the 
atmosphere upon the part, and the withdrawal of that 
pressure within the young animal's mouth, which 
forces out the milk. Here is an adaptation of 
instinct to the physical constitution of the atmos- 
phere. Yet, again, all this would be insufficient 
without the addition of that Storge, or instinctive pa- 
rental affection, which leads the dam carefully to 
watch and defend its young. The most timid 
animals are ready to risk their lives, and undergo any 
hardships, to protect their young, which is a feeling 
quite distinct from the gratification felt by the dam from 
her offspring drawing her milk. Here, then, are se- 
veral instincts, and the adaptation of the atmosphere 
to one of those instincts, all combining towards the 
preservation of the species ; which form, in conjunc- 
tion, as clear an indication of design as can be con- 



ON INSTTSCT. 31 

ceived. It is hardly possible to conceive any plainer 
mark of design, unless a person were beforehand to 
say that he intended to do a certain thing. Yet this 
is not all ; for the secretion of milk is not common to 
both sexes, and all ages and all times. Here is the 
secretion of milk at a particular time, just corres- 
ponding with the need for it. If we found sickles pro- 
duced at harvest, fires lighted when the weather is cold, 
and sails spread when favourable winds blow, we should 
see clearly that these things were designed to effect a 
certain end or object. Now, in the case of the mother 
and the young, there is a secretion of milk at a particu- 
lar period, and in an animal of a distinct sex — the 
one which has given birth to the young. Yet the 
perpetuation of the species might take place if the 
milk had been so provided as to be constant and 
uniform in all ages and sexes. But what we do see 
is, means provided for an end, and just commensurate 
to that end. 

I will conclude with proposing one more ques- 
tion, which I consider well worthy of inquiry — that 
relating to the implanting and modification of Instinct 
in animals. The most widely diffused of all implant- 
ed and modified Instincts is that of Wildness or 
Tameness. Whether the original Instinct of brutes 
was to be afraid of man, or familiar with him, I will 
not undertake to say. My own belief is, that it is the 
fear of man that is the implanted instinct. But at 
any rate, it is plain that either the one or the other — 
wildness or tameness — must be an implanted and not 
an original Instinct. All voyagers agree, that when 
they have gone into a country which had not appa- 
rently been visited by man, neither bird nor beast ex- 
hibited fear. The birds perched familiarly upon their 
guns, or stood still to be knocked on the head. After 
the country had been for some time frequented, not 
only individual animals become afraid of man, but 
their offspring inherit that fear by Instinct. The 



32 ON INSTINCT. 

domesticated young of the cow, and the young of the 
wild cattle of the same species furnish illustrations 
of this fact. I have seen an account of an experiment 
tried with respect to these latter. In this instance, 
a very young calf of one of the breed of wild cattle 
still remaining in some of the forests in England, on 
seeing a man approach, lay crouching close, and pre- 
serving the most perfect stillness, apparently endea- 
voured to escape notice. On being discovered, it 
immediately put itself in an attitude of defence, com- 
menced bellowing and butting at the intruder with 
such violence that it fell forward upon its knees, its 
limbs, from its tender age, being yet scarcely able to 
support it. It rose and repeated the attack again and 
again, till by its bellowing, the whole herd came gal- 
loping up to its rescue. We all know how different 
this is from the action of a young calf of the domestic 
breed. 

To what extent Instinct is implanted in animals in 
consequence of the education received by many gene- 
rations of their predecessors, is a point to which the 
attention of the curious might be profitably directed. 
I have pointed out the road, and hope that the ques- 
tion may lead to important inquiries upon the subject. 



THE END. 



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